Are Some Animals Also Moral Agents? by Johannsen, Kyle
Animal Sentience 2019.189:  Johannsen on Chapman & Huffman on Human Difference 
1 
 
Are some animals also moral agents? 
Commentary on Chapman & Huffman on Human Difference 
 
 
Kyle Johannsen 
Department of Philosophy 
Trent University 
 
Abstract:  Animal rights philosophers have traditionally accepted the claim that human beings are 
unique, but rejected the claim that our uniqueness justifies denying animals moral rights. Humans 
were thought to be unique specifically because we possess moral agency. In this commentary, I 
explore the claim that some nonhuman animals are also moral agents, and I take note of its 
counter-intuitive implications.     
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Chapman & Huffman (2018) correctly note that the claim that human beings are unique has been 
used to try to justify atrocious actions and institutions, e.g., hunting, experimentation, and animal 
agriculture. In addition, they offer a number of reasons for believing that humans’ claim to 
uniqueness should be rejected. On their view, human beings are only unique in the same way that 
any particular species is different from other species. Although I am sympathetic to their 
argument, I am reluctant to give up the idea that there is a special way in which human beings 
are different from other species. In the philosophical literature on animals, it is conventional to 
distinguish between moral agents and moral patients, and to categorize human beings as agents 
and nonhuman animals as patients (Regan, 2004). Before we accept the claim that some animals 
are agents, too, we should take a close look at its implications.   
 In her commentary, Juergens (2018) notes that one way in which we are special is that we 
bear a moral responsibility to avoid causing harm (including harm to the environment), and that 
when we fail to fulfill this responsibility, we are responsible for rectifying the harms we have 
caused. Although Juergens does not use philosophical terminology, moral agency is what she is 
talking about. To put it simply, moral agency is the capacity to make choices for which one can be 
held morally responsible. Moral agents have the ability to understand moral reasons and to 
engage in moral dialogue, and thus they also have the ability to distinguish right actions from 
wrong actions. Because they possess these abilities, it is appropriate to ascribe moral duties to 
agents, and to blame them when they fail to fulfill these duties.   
 Traditionally, philosophers who maintain that animals have moral rights, such as the right 
to life, have been willing to concede that animals are not moral agents. Though animals have 
morally significant interests that warrant moral rights, e.g., interests in avoiding suffering and in 
satisfying their preferences, the conventional view is that animals do not owe duties to other 
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rights bearers. Since animals are owed obligations but do not owe obligations, they have been 
labeled ‘moral patients.’ Examples of moral patients in the human case include human infants 
and people with severe dementia.    
 Embedded in the distinction between human agents and animal patients is a particular 
version of the claim that human beings are unique. This uniqueness is different from superiority, 
however. The interests of animals matter just as much as the interests of human beings, and 
animals’ lack of agency is no good reason to think otherwise (Singer, 1975). After all, we do not 
think that the absence of agency deprives someone of moral status in the human case. The 
interests of infants and people with severe dementia matter just as much as the interests of other 
human beings.   
 Although the distinction between human agents and animal patients was long accepted 
in the animal ethics literature, the claim that animals lack agency has received criticism in recent 
years. It has been argued that many domesticated animals possess the cognitive capacities 
associated with agency (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011), and there is certainly a case to be made 
for the claim that great apes, whales, and dolphins do, too (Fields, 2008; Andrews et al., 2018). 
Whereas it would be implausible to claim that most animals are moral agents, some animals might 
be. And if some animals are moral agents, then the claim that human beings’ agency makes 
humans unique is no longer sustainable. The distinction between human agents and animal 
patients would have to be replaced by a distinction between animals who are agents (humans 
included) and animals who are patients.   
 Though some nonhuman animals possess very impressive cognitive abilities, we should 
pause for a moment and consider what attributing moral agency to them implies. I have no doubt 
that great apes, whales, and dolphins have morally significant interests (just as other animals do), 
but should we be holding them morally responsible for their behavior? Should, for example, 
whales and apes who harm other sentient beings be morally blamed? After all, whales and apes 
do harm other sentient beings. Orcas, for example, eat both fish and various sea mammals. And 
chimpanzees, for example, are omnivores whose diet is partially composed of meat from animals 
they have killed (Fahy et al., 2013). If it seems inappropriate to blame orcas and chimpanzees for 
such behavior, then we should be reluctant to ascribe moral agency to them. 
 There may be an easy way around the problem I have highlighted. We might say that the 
nonhuman animals who possess agency are only partial agents, not full agents. Or we might say 
that the sort of agency they possess is different from moral agency – that they can make 
meaningful choices about how to act (they are not simply biological robots), but that they 
nonetheless lack the cognitive abilities necessary to be morally responsible for those choices.  Of 
course, taking this route means leaving intact the claim that our moral agency makes us special.   
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